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This paper studies the extent to which market crashes are predictable for a set of 
six countries, focusing in particular on possible differences between transition 
economies (The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and mature markets (UK, 
US and EU). We estimate a set of individual country and pooled specifications to 
find that market crashes, in the broader sense, are predictable for all countries 
analysed. We additionally investigate the role that investor heterogeneity, proxied 
by trading volume, plays in this predictability and find some varying results 
between countries. For the Central and Eastern European Countries (CE3), an 
increase in trading volume relative to trend appears to have great predictive 
power, a result that is supportive of the theory of investor heterogeneity outlined 
in the relevant background studies. For the more mature markets (G5), on the 
other hand, market crashes appear more likely to follow a period of increased 
stock prices and returns, a result fitting a number of traditional theories, in 
particular the stochastic bubble model. Further analysis, allowing for time-varying 
coefficients, confirms the volume-crash relationship for the CE3 and provides 
preliminary evidence that macro news releases may additionally contribute to the 
predictability of market crashes. 
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Voiko markkinoiden romahduksia ennustaa? 
Lisänäyttöä kansainvälisestä osakemarkkina-
aineistosta 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 22/2006 
Terhi Jokipii 




Tässä työssä tutkitaan markkinoiden romahdusten ennustettavuutta kuudessa en-
nalta valitussa maassa. Erityisesti keskitytään siirtymätalouksien (Tšekki, Unkari 
ja Puola) ja kehittyneiden markkinoiden (Iso-Britannia, Yhdysvallat ja euroalue) 
välisiin mahdollisiin eroihin. Tutkimuksen empiirisessä osassa kunkin yksittäisen 
maan aineistosta sekä kaikki maat kattavasta paneeliaineistosta estimoidaan 
osakemarkkinoiden tuottojakauman vinoudelle malli, jonka estimaattien perus-
teella romahdusten ennustettavuutta pyritään arvioimaan. Estimointien yhteydessä 
tarkastellaan myös sijoittajien heterogeenisuuden merkitystä markkinanotkahdus-
ten kannalta. Heterogeenisuutta mitataan kaupankäynnin volyymilla. Tulosten 
mukaan kaupankäynnin volyymin suhteellisella kasvulla pitkän aikavälin trendiin 
nähden on ennustevoimaa keskisen ja itäisen Euroopan (CE3) maissa. Tältä osin 
tulokset ovat sopusoinnussa sijoittajien heterogeenisuuden vaikutuksia käsittele-
vien teorioiden kanssa. Kehittyneissä talouksissa osakemarkkinoiden romahdukset 
näyttäisivät sen sijaan seuraavan osakemarkkinahintojen ja -tuottojen nousujakso-
ja, mikä on sopusoinnussa joidenkin perinteisten teoreettisten hypoteesien, kuten 
stokastisten arvostuskuplien, kanssa. Alustavat lisätarkastelut, joissa kaupankäyn-
nin volyymin vaikutusten sallitaan vaihdella ajassa, vahvistavat myös käsitystä, 
että kokonaistaloudellisten uutisten julkaiseminen parantaa markkinoiden romah-
dusten ennustettavuutta. 
 
Avainsanat: osakemarkkinoiden tuotot, vinous, kaupankäynnin määrä, markkinoi-
den romahdus 
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In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macro 
economic fluctuations in both mature as well as in developing countries. In light 
of this experience, despite their focus on maintaining price stability, there is a 
growing belief that central banks should additionally monitor asset price 
developments more closely.
1 
  The importance of studying the properties of asset returns is manifold since 
asset prices serve multiple roles in a modern economy. Asset prices have the 
potential to affect aggregate demand, either through the net worth of consumer 
wealth or alternatively through its effect on business balance sheets. Furthermore, 
asset prices have the ability to lead to financial fragility via the impending growth 
of asset price bubbles and their subsequent bursting. Ultimately however, asset 
price volatility is capable of leading to excessive lending and risk-taking, 
eventually evolving into asset price booms and subsequent busts. Financial 
institutions in particular are vulnerable to asset price collapses, firstly because of 
the decline in the value of collateral they hold, but also due to the general increase 
in uncertainty that may lead to a flight to quality and to a widespread reduction in 
lending that could affect even the most solvent institution. Literature has 
subsequently highlighted the importance of asset price declines in triggering 
banking crises (see among others Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Mishkin, 1994; 
Allen and Gale, 1998b; Marshall, 1998) emphasising the importance of 
determining the degree to which markets are crash-prone, and the key economic 
mechanisms driving this phenomenon. 
  It is possible to think of the riskiness of any asset as essentially being made up 
of at least three different elements: its standard deviation (the overall dispersion in 
possible outcomes); its skewness (the relative probability of a positive or negative 
surprise); and its kurtosis (the probability of an extreme outcome). While the 
standard deviation or variance measures the spread of possible returns, skewness 
adds a further richness to this picture by measuring the concentration of the 
probability in downside or upside returns. On the one hand, positive skewness 
resembles a large probability of a small loss offset by a small probability of a 
large gain, while negative skewness, on the other hand, represents a small 
probability of a large loss offset by a large probability of a small gain. Therefore, 
the more negatively skewed the distribution of a set of assets, the greater the 
chance of the return being below rather than above expected returns. If the degree 
of negative skewness falls, then it may be suggested that market expectations are 
changing and that a tendency towards a diminished expectation of sharp falls in 
share prices exists. The degree to which market returns are negatively skewed 
                                                 
1 See for example Gertler et al (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Greenspan (1999), Vickers 
(1999).  
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therefore serves as an indication of the perception of downside risk to a set of 
assets, additionally acting as an indicator of the extent to which these markets are 
crash-prone. 
  While much work has investigated the nature, extent and persistence of 
asymmetry in asset returns, only very recently has the focus shifted towards 
understanding the role of trading volume in this relationship. Key papers in 
addressing this area are Chen, Hong and Stein (2001); Hong and Stein (2003); 
Hueng and Brooks (2003); Charoenrook and Daouk (2004). Using a variety of 
datasets, they generally find that while relationships do exist between the risk, 
return and levels of prices and of volume, these relationships are complex and 
subtle. Much of the work has however focussed primarily on estimating the 
determinants of asymmetries in the US (see among others Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers, 1989; Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Hong and Stein, 2003; and Hueng 
and Brooks, 2003), in particular concentrating on daily returns of individual 
stocks. Cross-country evidence together with a concrete understanding of 
aggregate market asymmetries is however lacking. 
  In this paper, we address these outstanding issues and analyse the degree to 
which market crashes are predictable in six international markets; the Czech 
Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), the United States (US), United 
Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU). Following Hong and Stein (2003), we 
consider a ‘crash’ to encompass three distinct elements: 1. an unusually large 
movement in stock prices; 2. that this movement is negative; and 3. that the effect 
is a contagious market-wide phenomenon.
2 In particular, we focus our 
investigation on understanding differences that exist between the Central 
European countries (CE3) and more mature (G5)
3 markets in this respect. We 
estimate a set of individual country equations, as well as panel regressions and 
find that market crashes are predictable for all countries in our sample. Our 
estimations further allow us to analyse the role that trading volume takes on in this 
predictability. We find that for the CE3, crashes appear more likely in markets 
that have experienced an increase in trading volume relative to trend. This finding 
is in line with the theoretical underpinnings of this paper. Regarding the G5 
however, market crashes appear to be more pronounced in markets that have 
recently experienced an increase in stock prices and returns. This finding is 
congruent with some of the more traditional investor theories. In particular, the 
stochastic bubble model put forward by Blanchard and Watson (1982). The 
uncovered discrepancies are further explored though the implementation of a state 
space model, allowing for the investigation of time varying coefficients. In 
                                                 
2 The ‘crash’ involves an abrupt highly correlated decline in the prices of an entire class of stocks 
rather than in just a single stock. 
3 We consider these markets as the G5, as they comprise five of the seven G7 countries, namely, 
the US, UK, Italy, France and Germany. They subsequently represent a sample of wealthier or 
more mature markets.  
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addition to addressing the gaps in the literature, our findings raise two further 
issues which have not yet been addressed in this previous literature. We 
experiment with different time-horizons for measuring skewness and discover that 
the choice of time horizon does have a notable impact on statistical power.   
Moreover we briefly explore the extent to which the release of macro news affects 
trading volume and its subsequent impact on predicting market crashes. We 
conclude that this relationship deserves further investigation. 
  The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
theoretical literature put forward to explain return asymmetries and outlines the 
theoretical model motivating our empirical estimations. Section 3 describes the 
data adopted for our analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical specification and 
results. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
 
 
2  The asymmetry of market returns 
Research in finance has shown that that the assumption of the normality of price 
variations in financial markets inadequately represents the short-term returns of 
financial assets and that negative asymmetries in stock returns do exist. While this 
asymmetry of returns is generally not disputed, the underlying effects driving this 
phenomenon are less clear. Two main lines of theoretical research have emerged 
to explain this: the first, typified by Black (1976); Blanchard and Watson (1982); 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987); Schwert (1989) and Campbell and 
Hentschel (1992) suggests, from a variety of perspectives, that the role of 
representative investors may change as markets move. This line of reasoning is 
based on understanding the underlying economic mechanisms reflected, and 
focuses on representative investor theories of asymmetry including the ‘leverage 
effect’, stochastic bubble models as well as the ‘volatility feedback’ mechanism. 
  Probably the most reputable of the representative investor theories for 
asymmetry in stock prices is based on the ‘leverage effect’ (Black, 1976; Christie, 
1982) which considers that a drop in prices raise both operating and financial 
leverage, in turn reducing the volatility of subsequent returns. In this case, 
leverage is reduced after an increase in price causing the skewness of returns to 
become more negative after a period of price return decline. Black (1976) 
reported that implied and historical volatilities of individual stocks go up when the 
stock prices go down, however it has since been argued that the leverage effect is 
too small to account for this phenomenon (Christie, 1982; Schwert, 1989). An 
alternative theory typified by Blanchard and Watson (1982), models stochastic 
bubbles which imply the existence of two distinct regimes in generating stock 
returns; one where the bubble collapses and one where it survives. Rational 
investors take this into consideration when deciding whether to invest in an asset.  
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Here, the popping of the bubble- a low probability event produces large negative 
returns resulting in negative skewness following the end of period sustained return 
increases. Formally however, this bubble is essentially argued to be incomplete 
(Spotton and Rowley, 1998). Finally, the ‘volatility feedback’ mechanism 
(Pindyck, 1984; French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 
1992) recognises that an increase in the volatility of returns exacerbates price 
decline, therefore causing the distribution to become more negatively skewed. 
When a large piece of good news hits the market, the positive news will tend to be 
followed by other large pieces of news (volatility persistence) subsequently 
increasing future expected volatility. As a result, the required rate of return rises 
causing a fall in the stock price and hence dampening the positive impact of the 
news. Poterba and Summers (1986) however, point out that shocks to market 
volatility are short-lived and therefore cannot be expected to have a large impact 
on risk premiums. 
  In contrast, an alternate and more recent line of research can be stylized by the 
heterogeneity of investor beliefs about the future course of market returns. This 
theory has its roots in the belief that investors differ in their opinion about the 
fundamental value of stocks, which subsequently affects both the volatility and 
the volume of returns. Deriving in large part from Epps and Epps (1976) who 
measure the amount of disagreement among investors based on the arrival of new 
information in the market, this research has generally provided support for the 
relationship between trading volume and dispersion (and thus indirectly the mean 
level) of returns. Research has subsequently shown that trading volume can proxy 
for the intensity of disagreement. (See among others Kim and Verrecchia, 1991a, 
1991b; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Shalen, 1993; and Kandel and Pearson, 1995) 
When disagreement (trading volume) is high, it is more likely that the information 
held by bearish investors is incompletely revealed in prices, setting the stage for 
negative skewness of returns in subsequent rounds of trade. This reasoning 
follows that accumulated ‘hidden’ information tends to come out during market 
declines supporting the view that returns are negatively skewed. 
  Since our paper is concerned with understanding differences between 
countries of varying degrees of development, we focus our empirical analysis on 
testing whether differences in opinion about the fundamental value of stocks 
differs between these countries. We might expect to find a larger degree of 
divergence for the CE3 countries than for the G5, particularly in the early part of 
the 1990s when these countries were far less stable than their more mature 
counterparts. Each of the three CE3s analysed here underwent significant market 




2.1  Theoretical model: heterogeneity of investor beliefs 
The empirical investigation in this paper addresses the question of whether stock 
markets may be vulnerable to crashes. As outlined in the introduction, our 
definition of a ‘crash’ encompasses three distinct elements each grounded in a set 
of robust empirical facts.
4 
  The Hong and Stein model (H-S) encompasses all the three empirical 
regularities covered, focussing in particular on the consequences of differences of 
opinion among investors. The model predicts that negative skewness in returns 
will be most pronounced around periods of heavy trading volume since, like many 
other models with differences of opinion, trading volumes proxy for the intensity 
of investor disagreement. (See Varian, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and 
Pearson, 1995; and Odean, 1998a). 
  Difference of opinions is modelled by assuming that two investors, A and B 
each receive a private signal about a stocks terminal payoff. Investors are assumed 
to be overconfident and therefore concentrate on their own private information in 
order to make inferences about the value of a stock. Even if information regarding 
investor A’s (B) private information is revealed via prices, investor B (A) 
concentrates on his/her own signal. Such an assumption maintains a level of 
divergence in opinion between investors and preserves varying valuations for the 
asset. 
  Additional traders in the form of fully rational, risk-neutral arbitrageurs enter 
the model. The arbitrageurs recognize that the best estimate of the stocks true 
value is formed by averaging the signals of A and B. Due to the fact that investors 
A and B face short-sales constraints, the arbitrageurs will not always get to see 
both signals. It is important to note that arbitrageurs are not short-sale constrained 
and can therefore take infinitely large positive or negative positions at zero cost. 
The market in which these traders operate is fully efficient in that there is no 
predictability of returns. This comes about from the presence of the arbitrageurs 
who are assumed to be rational, risk-neutral and unconstrained. Only one stock is 
traded which can be thought to be the market portfolio. 
  Trading takes place on two dates, t1 and t2 after the individual signals are 
revealed. The first two elements of our definition of a crash are captured by the 
model since it is evident that the price movement at t2 may be completely out of 
proportion to the signal revealed at this time as it may additionally reflect the 
impact of a previously hidden signal. Essentially, here the trading process can 
cause the endogenous exposure of built-up private information, and can lead to 
large price changes based only on small observable contemporaneous news 
events.
5 The fundamental asymmetry in the model is introduced via the notion 
                                                 
4 See Hong and Stein (2003) for a detailed description of the definition adopted here. 
5 For a more detailed explanation of this model see Hong and Stein (2003).  
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that more total information comes out when the market is falling rather than 
rising, essentially stating that the biggest observed price movements are more 
likely to be declines, a phenomenon corresponding closely to historical facts (see 
among others Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989). 
  The final element of the definition relates to the inherent contagion or 
increased correlation of stocks during a downturn. For this purpose, the model 
considers a portfolio of stocks, whereby the possibility of a sell-off in one stock 
causes the release of pent-up information that is not only relevant for pricing stock 
i, but also for pricing stock k. Resultantly, the release of bad news tends to 
heighten the correlation among stocks, having the potential to affect the price of j 
despite the lack of contemporaneous news relating to its own fundamentals. 
  In addition to governing the degree of negative skewness, The H-S model 
further shows that the ex ante divergence of opinions additionally determines the 
level of trading volume. In particular, when the difference of opinion is great, 
trading volume is unusually great at both t1 and t2. This increase in trading volume 
is associated with the likelihood of investor B moving out of the market at time t1, 
and into the market at t2, exactly the effect that drives negative skewness. The 
comparative statistics of the H-S model with respect to the difference of opinion, 
hence predict that stock returns will be more negatively skewed following an 
increase in trading volume. To show this more clearly, we consider a situation 
where the heterogeneity of opinions (H) > the variance of the news received by 
investors (V). At time 0, both investors A and B have no initial endowment of the 
stock and prices are consequently set by the arbitrageurs who all agree on the 
stocks worth ex ante. Once the signals are revealed, trading volume will be 
proportional to the extent to which A’s and B’s signals differ from one another: 
2
S S B A − . This is the case since if at t2, A has the higher valuation, trading volume 
will be proportional to (SA – P2). Conversely, if B has the higher valuation, trading 
volume will be proportional to (SB – P2).
6 The implications for skewness follow 
since short-horizon skewness monotonically decreases in H for H > V therefore 




3 Data  description 
As our Table 3.1 indicates, market returns for the six international markets in our 
sample, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the US, UK and EU, all 
exhibit a degree of negative asymmetry. In particular, we see that the extent to 
which asymmetry persists is notably higher for the CE3 (from –0.81 in Hungary 
                                                 
6 For a formal proof see Hong and Stein (2003).  
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to –0.58 in Poland) countries when compared to more mature G5 (from –0.13 in 
the US to –0.30 in the EU) markets. A simple test of normality is based on the 
assumption that a normal probability density function has skewness equal to zero 
and kurtosis equal to three. The statistics here clearly indicate the rejection of 
normality for all market indices. The Jarque-Bera test examines the difference of 
the skewness and kurtosis of the series with those of the normal distribution. We 
see that this test is rejected at all levels of significance which consequently 
confirms the clear rejection of normality.
7 
 
Table 3.1    Total sample descriptive statistics 
 
Daily data: April 1994 to December 2004 
  CZ PL  HU  UK  US EU 
 Mean  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.03 
 Maximum  5.20  9.26  11.27  4.75  5.36  4.71 
 Minimum  -7.25  -11.01  -17.68  -4.72  -7.03  -5.31 
 Std. Dev.  1.29  1.90  1.75  0.99  1.11  0.95 
 Skewness  -0.64  -0.58  -0.81  -0.21  -0.13  -0.30 
 Kurtosis  4.99  6.07  14.39  5.30  6.56  5.60 
 Jarque-Bera  478.87  1070.90  15056.88  623.45  1450.42  813.17 
 Probability  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 




To construct or variables, we make use of 10 years of daily aggregate market 
return and trading volume data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the 
US, UK and EU.
8 Our sample begins on April 1
st 1994
9 and spans till the end of 
December 2004. All of the data is obtained from DataStream International. 
  Both the daily price index and volume data are aggregated on a non-
overlapping 20, 15 and 10-day basis. The choice of horizon is admittedly 
subjective; however the H-S model gives no guidance on this issue. Since much of 
the empirical literature in this field have adopted varying time frames for 
calculating observations of skewness we experiment by calculating skewness over 
20, 15 and 10-day periods respectively. The motivation for concentrating on 
smaller rather than longer time frames
10 stems from our adoption of market rather 
than individual stock returns, reducing the risk of having outliers strongly 
influence the data. Since the results obtained for each of the time frames are 
                                                 
7 The reported probability represents the likelihood that the Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in 
absolute value) the observed value under the null hypothesis. A small probability value leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution. 
8 All EU series were created by combining data for Germany before 1999 with EU data after 1999. 
9 This is the first date for which trading volume data was available for all countries of interest. 
10 Cheng, Hong and Sein (2001) calculate skewness over six-month periods. Charoenrook and 
Daouk (2004) obtaine skewness observations for one month intervals.  
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broadly similar, we present only those obtained for the 10-day period, since these 
returned the most significant results. Our sample therefore consists of a total of 
280 observations for each variable. 
 
 
Dependant and explanatory variables 
To measure the degree of negative skewness, we follow Chen, Hong and Stein 
(2001) and consider two varying approaches. The first is calculated by taking the 
negative of the third moment of daily returns and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of daily returns raised to the third power. Scaling the raw central third 
moment by the standard deviation is standard practice in skewness statistics, 
allowing for the comparison of returns with different variances (Greene, 1993). 
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Where Rit represents the average sequence of daily returns and n, the number of 
observations in each of the10-day periods. Here the negative coefficient forces the 
measure to increase as negative skewness increases. The desirability of this 
definition as a measure of skewness is discussed extensively in Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2001) and in Kearney and Lynch (2004b). 
  In addition to SKWit, we calculate an additional measure, DUVOLit, which 
does not involve third moments and is hence less likely to be overly influenced by 
extreme events. This measure considers ‘down-to-up-volatility’ whereby for any 
index i, over any 10-day period, t we distinguish between those that have returns 
below the period mean RitDOWN from those that have returns above the mean ritUP. 
The standard deviations of each of these sub-samples are then estimated 
separately. 
  The ratio of the standard deviation of ‘down’ days to the standard deviation of 
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Where nu and nd are the number of up and down days respectively. As with the 
previous measure presented in (4.1), the convention here is that a higher value of 
DUVOLit corresponds to a more negatively skewed distribution. 
  In addition to the skewness measures outlined above, our baseline 
specification includes several additional explanatory variables which are relatively  
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straightforward and do not require much explanation. For both volume and return 
variables, we additionally calculate the mean and standard deviations for each 10-
day period. Summary statistics of the aggregated data are presented in Table 3.2. 
The means of the series are broadly uniform in size, with the figures for Hungary 
and Poland demonstrating slightly negative values. The variance measures are 
again largely unvarying, ranging between 0.09 in the Czech Republic, to 0.03 in 
the US, the UK and the EU. The Skewness statistics are negatively signed for all 
markets and are notably larger for the CE3 countries than for the G5. 
 
Table 3.2  Descriptive statistics for international market 
     returns 
 
Aggregated data: April 1994 to December 2004 
  CZ PL HU UK US EU 
Returns 
 Mean  0.00  -0.03  -0.02  0.04  0.02  0.02 
  Maximum  0.77 0.45 0.66 0.58 0.51 0.47 
  Minimum  -1.16 -1.11 -1.17 -1.06 -1.09 -0.98 
  Std.  Dev.  0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  Skewness  -2.88 -1.44 -1.21 -1.09 -0.72 -0.65 
  Kurtosis  4.15 3.04 3.88 4.09 3.17 2.59 
StDev of Returns 
  Mean  1.08 1.22 0.99 0.80 0.98 0.96 
  Maximum  2.34 3.22 4.55 3.97 5.35 4.24 
  Minimum  0.29 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.24 
  Std.  Dev.  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Skewness  1.89 2.11 2.45 2.66 2.37 3.01 
 Kurtosis  9.66  7.37  24.55  35.75  2.44  28.59 
Sample Skewness 
  Mean  0.08  0.06 -0.25 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 
  Maximum  2.62 3.68 3.57 2.35 2.45 2.37 
  Minimum  -3.06 -1.67 -3.16 -1.89 -3.56 -2.06 
  Std.  Dev.  0.77 0.61 0.34 0.89 0.67 0.58 
  Kurtosis  4.18 2.47 2.53 3.08 3.11 2.86 
SKW 
  Mean  -0.11 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.56 -0.26 
  Maximum  17.68 22.34 12.13 10.39 56.66 54.72 
  Minimum  -15.25 -39.11 -18.66 -22.55 -45.24 -23.25 
DUVOL 
  Mean  -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
  Maximum  0.68 0.52 0.62 0.78 0.41 0.74 
  Minimum  -0.66 -0.78 -0.56 -0.51 -0.71 -0.48 
Note: These statistics are calculated on 10-day periods of returns aggregated from daily price 




Empirical work by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000), has provided 
significant evidence in favour of a substantial effect that liberalization has on both  
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liquidity as well as on volatility. In our study, each of the CE3 countries 
considered experienced periods of market development during much of our 
sample period. Included in this were events of both financial sector as well as 
stock market liberalization. We consequently include several measures to act as a 
control against these effects. 
  To capture financial market liberalization, we consider four distinct events as 
important; Bank ownership: a move towards privatization, Interest rates: date of 
liberalization; Credit control: elimination of controls; Deposits: the date when 
deposits in foreign currencies are allowed. Here the dummy series moves from 0 
to 1 in the period where the event took place.  A similar dummy is created for the 
date of stock market liberalization in each of the CE3 countries. The dates 
capturing the events of interest are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3  Financial and stock market liberalization: 
     event  dates 
 
  CZ HU  PL 
Financial liberalization 
Bank ownership  Privatization of 
state owned 
banks late 1991. 
01.01.95: Bank privatization 
beings. (creation of ÁPV Rt) 
In 1993 Bank 
privatization begins. 
Interest rates  Liberalization of 
interest rates in 
1992. 
Liberalization of interest 
rates in 1987 for enterprises 
and in 1992 for households. 
Liberalization of 
interest rates starting 
with 1990. 
Credit control  01.04.97: 
Removal of 
credit control. 
01.01.00: Liberalization of 
foreign currency 
denominated credits to non-
residents from OECD 
countries.  
 
01.06.01: The Ministry of 
Finance and the MNB lifted 
all remaining restrictions on 
foreign-exchange 
transactions for residents 
and non-residents. 
01.01.98: Required 
permission needed for 
short-term credit to 
non-residents lifted. 
Short term financial 
credit from residents to 
non-residents 
prohibited above a 
given limit.  
Deposits 01.01.01: 
Foreign deposits 
no longer require 
pre-approval. 
01.07.00: Residents allowed 
to deposit securities and 
earnings abroad.  
In 1990 deposits an 
foreign accounts 
allowed with limit 
Stock market liberalization 







01.06.90: Stock Exchange 
established.  
01.01.97: Foreigners 








Source: National Central Bank and National Supervisory Authority.  
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4  Empirical specification and results 
4.1  Predictability of skewness: individual countries 
Traditional investor theories of asymmetry explain why the skewness of returns 
may be predictable. The leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect imply 
that returns should be more negatively skewed following a stock price decline. 
The stochastic bubble model on the other hand implies that the distribution of 
returns should be more negatively skewed following a period of a stock price run 
up constituting a subsequent positive relationship between negative skewness and 
lagged returns. What we are predominantly interested in however, is the role that 
the heterogeneity of investor beliefs takes on here. This theory predicts that 
negative skewness will be more pronounced, and market crashes more likely, 
following periods of heaving trading volume. 
  In order to test the predictability of market crashes and subsequently the role 
that trading volume takes on in this predictability, we develop a baseline 
regression specification as below 
 
∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
=
−
== = = =
− − − − −
ζ + ϕ +
φ + ε δ + σ β + α + α =
5
0 j











j it ij j it ij j it ij j it ij j it ij 0 , i it
SKV
SDV V R SK SK
 (4.1) 
 
Here SKit denotes market return skewness in country i over any 10-day period t 
measured using both the SKWit and the DUVOLit measures of skewness outlined 
in the previous section. σi represents the standard deviations of returns; and Ri, 
excess returns; Vi represents trading volumes; SDVi, the standard deviation of 
trading volumes; and SKVi (or DUVOLVi), the skewness of trading volumes. 
Each regression additionally includes the control dummies defined in Section 4.1. 
A number of lags of past returns are included on the right hand side of the 
regression since the empirical model tries to isolate the predictive power that 
trading volume has on the incidence of negative skewness. It is therefore essential 
to control for the fact that past returns are known to be naturally correlated with 
trading volumes and that in addition, they can serve as predictors of skewness. 
(See Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986; Odean, 1998b). 
 
 
Results: individual country analysis 
Our results are presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 for the CE3 and the G5 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3. We include five lags of both the dependent and each of the independent 
variables respectively and correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
residual term. The constant terms are all negative, none however are statistically 
significant. Results obtained under the SKVit and the DUVOLit measures of 
skewness are very similar. We therefore chose to report those for SKWit to allow 
for a comparison with previous studies in this field. 
 
Table 4.3  Estimation summary statistics 
 
 R
2 MDV  SEE  DW  Q-Statistic #  OBS 
Czech Republic  0.52 -0.02 0.32 2.00  0.94  (0.86) 254 
Hungary 0.62  -0.07  0.25  1.98  1.27  (0.95) 266 
Poland 0.55  -0.05  0.27  2.03  0.76  (0.98) 255 
US 0.57  -0.07  0.25  2.02  1.19  (0.95) 266 
UK 0.43  -0.07  0.26  1.98  0.78  (0.98) 266 
EU 0.45  -0.07  0.25  2.01  0.42  (0.99) 266 
Note: MDV, SEE and DW represent mean dependent variable, standard error of the estimation and 
Durbin-Watson statistic respectively. 
 
 
Central and Eastern European countries (CE3) 
Looking first at Table 4.1, we find that all three moments of the price return 
variables are broadly insignificant for the CE3 countries. In particular, the sign of 
the coefficient of both the contemporaneous and the lagged returns variable, Ri 
vary throughout time, and across countries. The significant effect uncovered 
however, appears to be positive for all three countries. This would tend to indicate 
that when a relationship does exist between lagged return and the incidence of 
negative skewness, it is more likely to be positive. This finding is in line with the 
previous literature. Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Cheng, Hong and Stein 
(2001) both find that for daily stock prices and monthly trading volume for all 
NYSE and AMEX firms past return terms are always positive. The cross country 
study by Charoenrook and Daok (2004) investigates conditional skewness in 
aggregate market returns and unveils a similar result. Comparing their findings for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to ours, we find that the evidence 
uncovered is largely similar. Since the coefficients are significant only at the 10 
percent level, it is impossible for us to draw any meaningful conclusions from 
these results. 
  The volume variables returned on the other hand provide far more statistically 
significant results. We find that the lagged trading volume variable, Vi is 
significant at the one percent level for all three countries. The coefficients are 
uniformly positive both through time and across countries, indicating that stocks 
making up the indices being analysed are, everything else being equal, are more 
crash-prone following a surge in trading volume relative to trend. That is, market 
crashes in these countries appear to be more likely to follow a surge in trading  
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volume. These results are in line with previous studies in the field. Both Chen, 
Hong and Stein (2001) and Charoenrook and Daouk (2004) provide strong 
evidence that lagged trading volumes are directly associated with subsequent 
negative returns in the aggregate returns. 
  The control variables in general are not significant, though we do find that the 
liberalization of credit controls in Poland, in 1998, which came in the form of 
eradicating the need to seek permission to extend short-term credit to non-
residents, appears to be significant at the one percent level. 
  Generally, the results for the CE3 countries indicate that trading volume does 
have a highly significant impact on the incidence of negative skewness. In 
particular, the result shows that an increase in trading volume relative to trend 
would result in a pronounced prevalence of negative skewness in these countries. 
This finding is consistent with the theoretical model adopted in this paper which 
predicts that there should be a stronger negative relationship between lagged 
trading volume and skewness in countries where short selling is constrained. 
 
 
The US, UK and EU (G5) 
Turning then to the results for the G5 countries presented in Table 4.2, we see that 
the price return variables appear to be positive and highly significant for all 
countries. The negative relationship for the US, UK and EU are in line with the 
results of Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Cheng, Hong and Stein (2001). 
Moreover, the finding is in line with the study by Charoenrook and Daouk (2004) 
who also uncover a significant positive relationship between negative skewness 
and lagged returns for these countries. This result tends to suggest that markets to 
have recently experienced high levels of past returns are predicted to have more 
negative skewness, or all else equal, are more prone to collapse. 
  The contemporaneous and lagged volume variables on the other hand are only 
marginally significant for all three countries and in each case, the coefficient is 
very small. The signs and of the coefficients additionally vary throughout time 
and across countries. We generally find that the effect appears to be positive on 
the whole for these countries, however since the marginal level of significance is 
only ten percent, it is impossible to infer anything concrete from these findings. 
This result corresponds to that of Cheng, Hong and Stein (2001) who uncover a 
positive relationship between the volume variable and the incidence of negative 
skewness. They however, are unable to find any significant effects. It is possible 
that this difference in the significance could stem from the time horizon adopted 
in the calculation of the skewness observations, since our estimations with a 
longer time frame had a far more limited statistical power than those with shorter 
horizons. Similarly, Charoenrook and Daouk (2004) find weak evidence of 
trading volume as a predictor of negative skewness.  
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  Our results for the G5 countries are contrary to those uncovered for the CE3. 
Here we see that negative skewness tends to be most pronounced in stocks that 
exhibit positive lagged returns. While this finding does not relate to the 
predictions made by the model adopted in this paper, it is in line with a number of 
other theories, notably, the stochastic bubble model of Blanchard and Watson 
(1982) which predicts that negative skewness in returns following a period of a 
stock price run up. 
 
 
4.2  Predictability of skewness: panel analysis 
In order to shed some further light on the findings uncovered via the individual 
country estimations, we pool the data together into sub-samples by countries and 
estimate as series of panel regressions. We use pooled data in order to analyse 
common relationships across countries since it allows for the identification of 
country-specific effects that control for missing or unobservable variables. The 
motivation behind this segregated analysis is such that we wish to shed some light 
on the significant differences that were uncovered by via the individual country 
regressions. 
  Since our estimation includes as one of the regressors the lagged dependent 











j it it SK SK ε + η + β χ + γ + α = ∑ ∑
= =
−  (4.2) 
 
Where  ηi is a fixed-effect, χit is a ((T1 + T2 + ... Tk)*K) vector of exogenous 
regressors (the same as those used in equation (4.1)), and  ) , 0 ( N
2
it ε σ ≈ ε . 
  As before, SKit denotes market return skewness in country i over any 10-day 
period t, measured using either the SKWi or the DUVOLVi approach. 
 We  assume 
 
, 0
2 ≥ σε  (4.3) 
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Equation (4.2) is estimated, using the least squares dummy variable approach, 
separately for three sub-groups. We consider a CE3 group; where we include the  
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Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, a more mature markets group (G5); which 
is comprised of the UK, US and the EU and a total sample group with considers 
all countries together. Our panel specification for the CE3 group additionally 




Results: panel analysis 
Results for the panel analysis are reported in Table 4.4. As for the previous 
estimations, we report only results obtained under the SKWit estimate of 
skewness. Between groups, the results vary substantially. Lagged trading volume 
appears to be a strong predictor of market crashes for the CE3, with four out of 
the five lags returning highly significant results. The sign of the effect remains 
positive and constant through time, providing confirmation for the findings 
obtained under the individual country estimations. This result uncovers further 
evidence in favour of the theoretical underpinnings of the model adopted in our 
paper. Essentially, providing support for the notion that periods of heavy trading, 
proxying the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, does have a significant impact on 
the distribution of returns in the CE3. 
 
Table 4.4  Determinants of skewness in market returns: 
     panel  analysis 
 
  0 1 2 3 4  5 
Total sample 
SKi    -0.01 (0.37)  -0.08 (3.03)***  0.14 (5.76)***  -0.06 (2.38)***  0.00 (0.01) 
σi  -12.83 (0.57)  6.02 (0.25)  -11.22 (0.46)  0.65 (0.03)  -7.14 (0.29)  -0.47 (2.82)** 
Ri  28.49 (2.40)**  -8.82 (0.31)  -1.96 (3.07)***  -19.09 (1.67)*  -10.12 (0.35)  -1.69 (2.66)** 
Vi  0.55 (1.27)*  0.16 (2.33)**  0.55 (3.16)***  -0.17 (0.36)  -0.58 (1.25)  0.27 (0.64) 









SKi    0.13 (3.48)***  -0.03 (0.76)  0.18 (0.46)  0.09 (2.24)**  -0.10 (2.55)*** 
σi  8.51 (0.63)  2.21 (0.16)  -8.43 (0.59)  4.89 (0.34)  1.67 (0.12)  1.80 (0.13) 
Ri  28.01 (1.74)  6.62 (0.39)  13.81 (0.83)  7.80 (0.49)  -5.02 (0.32)  2.59 (0.16) 
Vi  0.05 (0.05)  0.15 (3.14)***  0.89 (3.82)***  0.31 (2.28)**  0.55 (1.46)  1.21 (3.16)*** 









SKi    0.17 (0.48)  -0.09 (2.53)***  0.17 (4.72)***  -0.04 (2.98)***  0.01 (0.39) 
σi  81.74 (1.24)  20.07 (1.99)**  28.58 (0.38)  -23.16 (0.31)  42.34 (0.57)  -3.92 (0.01) 
Ri  134.72 (0.52)  44.26 (2.12)**  80.53 (4.21)***  99.47 (3.71)***  59.42 (4.16)***  103.99 (2.56)** 
Vi  0.48 (0.76)  -0.05 (0.07)  0.30 (0.43)  -0.83 (1.22)  -0.92 (1.37)*  0.23 (0.39) 








Note: Absolute value of the t-statistic is presented in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the ten, five and one per cent levels respectively.  
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For the G5 countries on the other hand, we find that market crashes are generally 
preceded by movements in the price return variables. In particular, lagged price 
returns, Ri, uncover a consistently highly positive significant result through time, 
again confirming our individual country findings. Again, this finding tends to 
support the rendition of stock-price bubbles in existence within the G5 countries. 
Moreover, this result is in contrast to both the leverage and volatility feedback 
effects whereby the return distributions of stocks become more negatively skewed 
after a stock price decline. The ‘leverage effect’ theory particularly has been 
shown to have very little quantitative importance in explaining data, particularly 
high frequency data (Schwert, 1989; Bekaert and Wu, 2000), and while the 
volatility feedback effect is in some ways more attractive than the leverage-effect 
theory, its  ability to explain data is also questioned (Poterba and Summers, 1986). 
  Finally, including the total sample in the panel regression, we find that lagged 
dependent variable dominates as a predictor of market crashes in international 
market returns. The coefficients for the lagged skewness variables are varied 
however as the sign for these coefficients changes notably through time. We do 
however find some evidence in favour of relationships in existence between most 
of the independent variables and negative skewness of returns. This evidence is 
rather mixed and insubstantial. 
 
Table 4.5  Panel estimation summary statistics 
 
 R
2 MDV  SEE  DW  # OBS 
Total sample  0.44  0.43  1.53  1.99  1518 
CE3 0.41  -0.13  1.36  2.03  698 
G5 0.39  0.49  0.87  1.90  819 
Note: MDV, SEE and DW represent mean dependent variable, standard 
error of the estimation and Durbin-Watson statistic respectively. 
 
 
4.3  Volume-return relationships explored 
Since both the individual and the panel estimations returned some striking results 
relating to the role of volumes in predicting market crashes, we try to shed some 
further light on this through and extensive investigation between the types of 
relationships that exist between all the variables in the model. We therefore 
estimate a series of Vector Autoregressive models (VARs) enabling us to conduct 
a  Granger Causality / Box Exogeneity Wald test to unravel the extent of the 
relationships that exist between each of the variables in the country vectors below 
 
) SKV , SDV , V , R , , SK ( x it it it it it t i t σ =  (4.4) 
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Table 4.6  Block exogeneity test 
 
  α   β   δ   ε   φ   ϕ  
Czech Republic 
α  14.40 (0.15) 1.59 (0.44) 0.06 (0.97) 0.38 (0.02)** 0.38 (0.82) 2.53  (0.04)** 
β  0.69 (0.71) 8.62  (0.56) 0.11 (0.95) 0.41 (0.81) 0.16 (0.95) 1.29 (0.53) 
δ  2.51 (0.23) 5.31 (0.07)* 11.57  (0.31) 0.68 (0.71) 1.05 (0.09)* 2.46 (0.52) 
ε  3.31 (0.29) 1.79 (0.71) 0.06 (0.31) 6.72  (0.75) 19.01 (0.00)*** 3.52 (0.17) 
φ  3.09 (0.21) 0.72 (0.69) 0.59 (0.74) 2.89 (0.25) 35.55  (0.00)*** 3.34 (0.18) 
ϕ  4.92 (0.28) 0.69 (0.73) 8.13 (0.31) 1.23 (0.57) 1.69 (0.43) 10.51  (0.39) 
Hungary 
α  5.00 (0.89) 5.19 (0.07) 2.42 (0.29) 5.31 (0.07)* 2.79 (0.25) 5.73 (0.05)** 
β  1.07 (0.58) 14.35  (0.16) 4.48 (0.11) 6.90 (0.03)** 8.86 (0.01)** 2.12 (0.35) 
δ  2.41 (0.29) 6.25 (0.04)** 9.21  (0.51) 4.32 (0.12) 3.08 (0.22) 2.49 (0.28) 
ε  0.04 (0.41) 2.08 (0.03) 1.49 (0.47) 22.08  (0.11) 33.83  (0.00)*** 0.36 (0.84) 
φ  0.20 (0.90) 3.45 (0.00) 1.01 (0.60) 6.12 (0.04)** 70.67  (0.00)*** 0.40 (0.82) 
ϕ  0.46 (0.79) 2.90 (0.23) 0.54 (0.56) 0.09 (0.96) 0.37 (0.82) 20.31  (0.02)** 
Poland 
α  14.65 (0.14) 0.64 (0.58) 0.18 (0.91) 1.11 (0.57) 2.78 (0.25) 4.33 (0.09)* 
β  1.59 (0.75) 19.77  (0.03)** 2.29 (0.32) 7.91 (0.01)** 4.86 (0.28) 2.64 (0.26) 
δ  2.49 (0.29) 0.18 (0.91) 12.42  (0.25) 2.01 (0.35) 2.35 (0.31) 1.92 (0.38) 
ε  3.63 (0.63) 1.38 (0.07)* 5.05 (0.26) 14.83  (0.14) 24.06 (0.00)*** 0.79 (0.68) 
φ  0.98 (0.61) 0.48 (0.34) 1.39 (0.49) 7.34 (0.02)** 57.28  (0.00)*** 0.48  (0.79) 
ϕ  3.85 (0.15) 0.12 (0.94) 1.64 (0.17) 3.06 (0.22) 1.27 (0.53) 10.84  (0.37) 
US 
α  15.02 (0.13) 6.95  (0.03)** 0.72 (0.69) 3.99 (0.12) 4.24  (0.12) 2.41  (0.30) 
β  0.01  (0.99) 41.13  (0.00)*** 1.21 (0.54) 3.87 (0.14) 0.78 (0.67) 1.04  (0.59) 
δ  3.96 (0.14) 20.42 (0.00)*** 7.43  (0.68) 12.63 (0.00)*** 1.13  (0.00)*** 5.28  (0.07)* 
ε  3.52 (0.17) 8.07 (0.02)** 3.26 (0.19) 51.95  (0.00)*** 13.68  (0.00)*** 1.43  (0.48) 
φ  4.10 (0.12) 0.02 (0.99) 1.68 (0.43) 18.32 (0.00)*** 68.89  (0.00)*** 0.70  (0.70) 
ϕ  3.26 (0.19) 0.76 (0.68) 0.77 (0.67) 8.07 (0.01)** 0.07  (0.92) 7.94  (0.63) 
UK 
α  6.35 (0.78) 3.53  (0.17) 0.72 (0.70) 0.87 (0.65) 0.25  (0.88) 0.23  (0.89) 
β  0.00  (0.99) 45.91  (0.00)*** 0.09 (0.95) 6.49 (0.33) 3.64 (0.16) 1.31  (0.52) 
δ  0.45 (0.79) 26.49 (0.00)*** 4.63  (0.92) 2.99 (0.22) 0.39  (0.82) 1.57  (0.46) 
ε  4.27 (0.12) 3.18 (0.20) 2.79 (0.25) 20.85  (0.02)** 40.77  (0.00)*** 1.61  (0.45) 
φ  2.75 (0.25) 2.20 (0.33) 2.57 (0.07)* 8.02 (0.01)** 84.80  (0.00)*** 3.13  (0.21) 
ϕ  2.78 (0.25) 0.77 (0.68) 3.36 (0.19) 3.95 (0.14) 8.99  (0.01)** 14.32  (0.15) 
EU 
α  5.89 (0.82) 10.54  (0.00)*** 1.21 (0.55) 1.53 (0.46) 0.19  (0.91) 1.12  (0.57) 
β  0.10  (0.95) 60.01  (0.00)*** 0.97 (0.62) 5.67 (0.05)** 3.67 (0.16) 0.82  (0.66) 
δ  0.65 (0.73) 45.83 (0.00)*** 9.07  (0.52) 1.35 (0.51) 0.42  (0.81) 1.69  (0.43) 
ε  0.79 (0.67) 1.14 (0.56) 1.28 (0.53) 53.19  (0.00)*** 30.64  (0.00)*** 16.14  (0.00)*** 
φ  3.11 (0.21) 2.78 (0.34) 2.65 (0.26) 35.63 (0.00)*** 37.68  (0.00)*** 15.01  (0.00)*** 
ϕ  1.61 (0.45) 0.51 (0.77) 5.50 (0.06)* 2.86 (0.21) 3.24  (0.19) 30.00  (0.00)*** 
Note: The table presents the χ
2 statistic for the block exogeneity test. The marginal significance 
level is presented in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the ten, five and one per cent 
levels respectively. Variables on the left hand side represent the excluded variables, while the 
horizontal variables are the dependent variables.  
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Table 4.7  Total market volume and return relationships 
 
The effect of volume on returns 
Czech Republic:  i V → i SK ;  i SDV → i R ;  i SDV → i V → i SK  
Hungary:  i V → i SK ; i V → i σ → i R ; i V → i SDV → i σ → i R ; i SDV → i SK  
Poland:  i V → i σ ; i SDV → i V → i σ ; i SKV → i SK  
US:  i V → i R ; i V → i σ → i R ; i V → i SK → i R  
UK:  
EU:  i V → i σ → i SK ; i V → i σ → i R  
The effect of returns on volume 
Czech Republic:  
Hungary:  
Poland:  i σ → i V → i SDV  
US:  i σ → i V → i SDV ; i σ → i V → i SKV  
UK:  i σ → i R → i SDV → i V ; i σ → i R → i SDV → i SKV  
EU:  i σ →  i R → i SKV  
Note: This table provides a summary of Table 4.7 above. SKi, σi and Ri denote skewness, standard 
deviation and excess returns of price return variables respectively. Vi, SKVi, SDVi denote trading 
volumes, skewness of  trading volume  and standard deviation of trading volumes respectively. 
 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.6. Here we present the χ
2 statistic together 
with the marginal significance level in brackets. Table 4.7 summarizes the 
findings in Table 4.6, presenting both the direct and the indirect relationships that 
exist between variables. 
 
 
Results: the effect of volumes on returns 
We first look at the influence of the volume variables on returns. For the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, the level of trading volume appears to have a direct 
relationship on the skewness of returns, a finding that is in line with both our 
single country and our panel regressions. Trading volume further directly impacts 
on the standard deviation of returns in both the Hungary and Poland. We are 
further able to infer that trading volume has an effect on price returns through its 
impact on volatility in Hungary. The standard deviation of volumes directly 
affects price returns in the Czech Republic, and the skewness of returns in 
Hungary. Furthermore, volatility of trading volumes indirectly affects the 
skewness of returns through its affect on trading volumes in the Czech Republic. 
Moreover, trading volume volatility affects the volatility of return through its 
impact on trading volumes. Finally, a direct relationship is apparent between the 
skewness of volumes and the skewness of returns in Poland. 
  For the US, we find that trading volumes directly affect returns, while in the 
EU, returns are indirectly affected by trading volumes through its impact on  
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volatility. A further indirect effect is evident between trading volumes and the 
skewness of returns via price return volatility. 
 
 
Results: the effect of volumes on returns 
Looking at the impact of returns on trading volume, we find that the volatility of 
returns indirectly affects the standard deviation of volumes via the relationship 
with trading volumes. No other significant effects are evident for the CE3 
countries. 
  In the US, we find that the volatility of trading volumes is indirectly affected 
by the volatility of returns via trading volumes. Similarly, the volatility-volume 
relationship affects the skewness of volumes in the US. In the UK, the volatility of 
returns has an indirect effect on the standard deviation of trading volumes through 
its relationship with price returns. Similarly the volatility-price return relationship 
affects both trading volumes as well as the skewness of trading volumes. In the 
EU, the volatility of returns affects the skewness of volatility through price 
returns. 
  These estimations further allow us to consider the volume-volatility-skewness 
relationship suggested recently in the literature by Hueng and Brooks (2003) and 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2004). We find that for four of the six markets, (Poland, 
Hungary, the US and the UK) volumes lead volatility.  Similarly, in four of the six 
markets, (Poland, the US, the UK, and the EU) we are able to identify effects 
from volatility to volume. These results are interesting. Kearney and Lynch 
(2004b) also find evidence of an important relation in existence between volume 
and volatility operating through the third moment of price returns. At a country 
level however, their results differ somewhat. They find significant effects of 
volume leading volatility for the UK and Germany while we find no evidence of 
this. Furthermore, they find that feedback effects from volatility to volume are 
significant for the UK, a result our data is unable to confirm. 
 
 
4.4 Further  investigation 
Results obtained under both the single country and the panel estimations highlight 
a distinct difference between the role of trading volume in forecasting crashes for 
the CE3 and G5. These findings were further confirmed via the Granger 
Causality / Box Exogeneity Wald  test which explored the direction of causality 
between the volume-return relationships. While these findings are somewhat 
unsurprising considering the varying degrees of development and stability 
between countries during our sample period, it is essential to delve deeper into 
these results in order to decipher the root of the discrepancy. In essence we wish  
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to understand whether it is in fact an increase in trading volume, or the existence 
of the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, predicting market crashes, or whether it is 
some other institutional effect underlying the Central European countries that 
merely creates an illusion. 
  We with simple graphical analysis of daily trading volume for each country as 
presented in Figure 4.1. The individual country graphs presented depict the 
number of trades that occurs daily, and additionally includes a measure of average 
trading volume over the ten year period, illustrated by a bold red line. From the 
individual country graphs we see that no obvious pattern of trading volume for the 
CE3, either pre or post transition phase, is evident as we may have expected. 
Rather, when compared to the G5 we the striking difference is the existence of 
extreme dates of trading volume relative to trend. For the G5, trading volume is 
much more consistent through time, with ‘extreme’ trading volume never drifting 
far beyond the average. 
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In order to test whether extreme trading volume does in fact drive the volume-
skewness effect that our results have returned to date, we allow for the possibility 
of time-varying coefficients, that is, we estimate a state space model and plot the 
evolution of these coefficients over time. Essentially the estimation can be 
presented as follows 
 
t 1 t t
t t t 1 t





+ α + = α
ε + α + =
−
+  (4.5) 
 
Where αt is an m*1 vector of possibly unobserved state variables, ct, Vt, dt and Tt 
are conformable vectors and matrices, and where εt and vt are vectors of mean 
zero, Gaussian disturbances. Note that the unobserved state vector is assumed to 
move over time as a first-order vector autoregression. 
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Figure 4.2  Time-varying effect of lagged trading volume 





































































































































  The results are presented in Figure 4.2. They appear to provide strong 
evidence in favour of a varying effect of trading volume on market crashes 
through time. Essentially our findings indicate that lagged trading volume in each 
of the three CE3 countries predicts negative skewness. Moreover, they highlight 
that this effect is dominated by only very few extreme periods. 
  One aspect of our definition of a ‘crash’ requires that the unusually large 
movement in stock prices occurs without a correspondingly large public news 
event. Despite the fact that many authors have shown that large asset price 
movements are many times very difficult to explain with tangible public 
information (see Roll 1984, 1988; Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989), we try to 
determine whether any of the extreme trading days are attributable to the release 
of information, or the occurrence of a significant event. We start by considering 
only the 10 largest incidence of negative skewness in each country and identify 
the time period during which it took place. Furthermore, making use of Lexis 
Nexis news databank we investigate whether any significant macro news was 
released during that 10-day period. This information is presented in Table 4.8. 
  Interestingly, we find that when we compare the dates of extreme trading 
volume (from Figure 4.1) to those of extreme negative skewness (presented in 
Table 4.8), for each country there is at least one occasion where we are able to 
detect a direct lagged relationship between the two variables. Considering the case 
of the Czech Republic, as seen in Figure 4.1, the largest incidence of negative 
skewness (March 1999) could possibly correspond to a significant spike in trading 
volume that took place in February 1999. A comparable spike in trading volume is 
evident in October 1998 and October 2003 with an occasion of extreme negative 
skewness apparent in November of each of those years respectively. A similar 
pattern of behaviour is observed for Poland and Hungary with the possibly related 
dates highlighted in red in Table 4.8. From this simple analysis, it appears that 
negative macro news, released on the date extreme negative skewness, could be 
anticipated in the days preceding. Further analysis into this relationship is 
however hindered by the necessity to aggregate data into 10-day periods for the 
calculation of a measure of negative skewness. Research in this field would 
therefore benefit from the estimation of a probabilistic model allowing for the 
daily analysis of changes in the incidence of negative skewness. A daily measure 
of negative skewness would allow for an in depth analysis of the extent to which a 
macro news-trading volume relationship affects the predictability of market 
crashes.  
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Table 4.8  Negative skewness and new releases 
 
   DATE SKEW  ANNOUNCEMENT 
         #  Date  Corresponding LexisNexis event 
CZ 
1 12.03.99  -17.49  5 12.03.99 unemployment  increases 
         11.03.99 interest rates rise 
        10.03.99 privatization of large banks postponed by one year 
        10.03.99 current account deficit increases 
        08.03.99 consumer price index falls 
2 05.11.98  -0.65  1  23.10.98 Moody's lowers banks' ratings 
3  16.10.03  -0.61  2  06.10.03 current account deficit increases 
         07.10.03 unemployment increases 
4 13.11.03  -0.28  2  10.11.03 consumer price index rises 
         12.11.03 current account deficit falls 
5 20.03.03  -0.16  2  17.03.03 Czech Republics government debt grows 
         20.03.03 GDP figures show a decline in growth 
6  07.06.96 -0.12  2 07.06.96 unemployment  decreases 
         10.06.96 consumer price index increases 
7  21.02.02 -0.10  1 08.02.02 unemployment  figures  rise 
8  13.05.94 -0.09  2 08.08.01 unemployment  figures  rise 
         09.08.01 Nomura sues Czech state for kc40bn 
compensation for IPB 
9  27.03.96  -0.08  2  20.03.96 GDP figures show signs of economic growth 
         26.03.96 improvement in the terms of trade 
10  30.12.96  -0.08  3  22.11.96 current account deficit increases 
         25.11.96 unemployment increases 
HU 
1 11.02.99  -11.26  2  02.02.99 unemployment figures rise 
        11.02.99 consumer price index rises 
2  14.01.99 -8.32  1 06.01.99 unemployment  figures  rise 
3  01.08.99 -1.93  2 04.08.99 unemployment  increases 
         11.08.99 consumer price index rises 
4  20.02.00 -1.45  3 10.02.00 unemployment  figures  rise 
         11.02.00 consumer price index rises 
         18.02.00 short term interest rates rise 
5  19.08.94 -1.45  0    
6  14.04.03 -1.42  2 10.04.03 EU  announces  EU13million  in  funding 
for candidate countries 
         11.04.03 consumer price index rises 
7  15.12.97 -1.36  1 11.12.97 consumer  price  index  rises 
8  23.10.03 -1.14  1 14.10.03 consumer  price  index  rises 
9  30.05.96 -0.89  1 30.05.96 consumer  price  index  rises 
10  26.06.03  -0.74  1  24.06.03 Latest macro reports suggest fragile signs of recovery  
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   DATE SKEW  ANNOUNCEMENT 
         #  Date  Corresponding LexisNexis event 
PL 
1  08.09.00  -29.61  2  08.09.00 increase in the consumer price index 
         08.09.00 improvement in the terms of trade 
2  28.07.00 -19.94  2 25.07.00 unemployment  decreases 
         01.08.00 current account deficit increases 
3 16.11.04  -15.14  2  16.11.04 consumer price index rises 
        16.11.04 unemployment decreases 
4 16.08.01  -14.96  1  13.08.01 consumer price index falls 
5  02.06.00  -14.57  1  02.06.00 current account deficit decreases 
6  19.03.04  -14.44  1  23.03.04 GDP figures show signs of economic growth 
7  05.05.99  -14.24  1  05.05.99 current account deficit increases 
8  20.11.03 -11.66  0    
9  13.05.02  -11.58  1  08.05.02 Nordea Banking Group to Take Over LG Petro Bank 
10  04.04.02  -11.01  1  04.04.02 DZ Bank Takeover Bid for AmerBank 
 
 
5  Comments and conclusions 
Motivated by the difference of opinion theory outlined by Hong and Stein (2003), 
this paper conducts an empirical investigation addressing the question of why 
stock markets may be vulnerable to crashes. In particular, considering aggregate 
market returns of six countries; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the US, UK 
and EU we analyse whether differences exist between countries that have been in 
transition during much of the sample period when compared to more mature 
markets. 
  Adopting two different measures of skewness for our analysis, we estimate a 
series of single country regression equations. Our findings tend to indicate that for 
all countries in the sample, market crashes are predictable. Moreover, relating to 
the role that trading volume takes on in this predictability, our results uncover 
some distinct differences between countries. For the CE3, our estimations provide 
evidence in favour of the investor heterogeneity theory whereby market crashes 
appear more likely in countries to have recently experienced an increase in trading 
volume relative to the trend. This finding is in line with the theoretical predictions 
of the model motivating the empirical estimations in this paper. For the G5 
however, we determine that market crashes appears most prominent after a period 
of increased prices and returns. A finding that is more in line with traditional 
representative investor theories, in particular the stochastic bubble model put 
forward by Blanchard and Watson (1982). While these findings are broadly in line 
with the literature in this field, their comparability is restricted. Due to restricted 
statistical power, these studies have focussed on analysing individual stocks rather 
than aggregate market returns. Experimenting with different time-horizons for 
calculating skewness, our study finds that the length of the horizon does affect the  
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statistical power of results. Literature in this field may therefore benefit from 
more research into the optimal time-horizon for calculating skewness 
observations. 
  Estimating a set of panel equations, we are able to confirm that volume 
variables appear significantly more important for forecasting crashes in the CE3, 
while in lagged skewness appears to be the driving force in the G5 markets. We 
further explore the relationships between all volume and return variables by 
conducting a Granger Causalit / Box Exogeneity Wald test. The results provide 
further confirmation of our previous results. 
  Allowing for time-varying effects we delve deeper into these findings. 
Graphical analysis of our findings show that lagged trading volume in each of the 
CE3 countries seems to predict market crashes. Moreover it shows that the results 
obtained under the single country and panel estimations are dominated by only 
very few extreme periods. We assess whether these incidents of extreme trading 
volume are attributable to the release of macro news, and while we find that a 
relationship does appear to exist, further investigation is hindered by the necessity 
to aggregate data into 10-day periods for the calculation of a measure of negative 
skewness. This field of study would therefore benefit greatly from the 
development of a probabilistic model for estimating daily skewness observations. 
A high frequency measure of negative skewness would allow for a deeper analysis 
into the extent to which macro news releases affect trading volume and 
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